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This paper presents an optimal ﬁscal policy response to address the basic trade-
oﬀ between the automatic stabilisation properties of budgets and the long run ﬁscal
positions. The framework is an overlapping generations model ` a la Weil (1989), ex-
tended to account for stochastic endowments and borrowing constrained households.
A benign government chooses over the optimal degree of responsiveness of net taxes to
individual incomes, an optimal measure of long-run public debt, or both, in order to
smooth households’ consumption across states of nature. In the presence of a deﬁcit
constraint for the government, the results unambiguously point to the desire for lower
debt levels than those currently prevailing in order to enable a more eﬀective hedging
of personal income uncertainty by means of more active ﬁscal stabilisers. Citizens in
economies exhibiting more pronounced cycles will favour less automatic stabilisation
combined with a more aggressive policy of debt reduction.
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1Non-technical summary
Following years of relatively ineﬀective ﬁscal policy, characterised, inter alia, by sub-
stantial increases in public debt, mature industrialised countries have been repeatedly
called upon to build a new regime embodying ﬁscal discipline and a more deliberate
reliance on rule-based as opposed to discretionary policymaking. In this context, coun-
tries have to reconcile a sustainable steady state budgetary position with an enhanced
role for their budget as a cushion against economic ﬂuctuations. It is on this tradeoﬀ
that this paper focuses.
We propose a means to jointly optimise over the optimal level of public debt and
the optimal degree of automatic stabilisation properties of government budgets when
households are subject to binding borrowing constraints. The framework underpinning
this analysis is a model in which the government implements a regime representative
of the optimal choice of a native generation, which is called upon to choose the optimal
level of government debt and the cyclical properties of taxation in the steady state.
The framework is an open economy one, where the government acts as a ﬁnancial
intermediary on international capital markets – where all debt is issued – on behalf of
its borrowing-constrained citizens. We show that the household, whilst not having any
altruistic tendencies with respect to new generations of taxpayers, has an incentive to
reduce government debt in order to boost consumption in periods of economic distress.
If the government in the model economy is not subject to a limit on the amount it
is able to borrow on international capital markets, the household always favours full
insurance via active ﬁscal stabilisation and avoids costly debt reduction. If, however,
governments are subject to a binding limit on the allowable deﬁcit, agents are no longer
able to purchase additional automatic ﬁscal stabilisation at no cost – rather, additional
ﬁscal stabilisation comes only at the cost of debt reduction.
We explore a situation in which there is a limit to the deﬁcit that the government can
run as a fraction of aggregate income. The results of this exercise indicate an appetite
for accelerated debt reduction in both the long run and the very long run in all cases.
In addition, they indicate a signiﬁcant pent-up demand for enhanced automatic ﬁscal
stabilisation. Lastly, results of this exercise show that current residents in economies
with a particularly volatile national income proﬁle would opt to ﬁnance more dramatic
cutbacks in public debt in order to ease borrowing constraints.
21 Introduction
Electorates in mature industrialised economies are at the crossroads of diﬃcult deci-
sions. International organisations repeatedly call upon them to repudiate once and for
all the course of ﬁscal proﬂigacy that many of them have displayed over most of their
past, and to take various combinations of the following policy actions:
(i) design a ﬁscal paradigm solidly built on the principles of sustainability and
intergenerational responsibility;
(ii) espouse the cause of “rules rather than discretion” in public ﬁnances – as has
been successfully done in monetary aﬀairs – and commit to a credible path for future
ﬁscal policy;
(iii) resuscitate the role of public budgets as shock absorbers, which had been
suﬀocated by years of high interest spending and recurrent spells of deﬁcit and debt
crises; and
(iv) seize the opportunity oﬀered by a growing economy to pursue a policy of
accelerated debt abatement to the advantage of future generations of taxpayers.
The adoption of explicit policy rules such as deﬁcit limits and balanced budget
legislation by governments in some of these countries has made a decisive contribution
to the enactment of this ambitious reform agenda. By setting a clear limit upon the
amount that governments can borrow on a year-by-year basis, these rules have laid
the foundations for a new ﬁscal regime capable of reconciling the ﬁrst and the second
objectives outlined above. But reconciling the third and the fourth objectives is a more
diﬃcult undertaking.
In this paper we present a model to tackle all of the above elements of the policy
debate. In particular, we address the trade-oﬀ that arises between the automatic
stabilisation properties of budgets and the long run ﬁscal positions of governments
and, accordingly, we are able to explicitly reconcile points (iii) and (iv) above. Our
methodological approach works through a simple partial equilibrium optimising model,
using as a backbone a dynastic overlapping generations framework ` a la Weil (1989).
We consider an open non-monetary economy in which individual gross incomes are
stationary and subject to aggregative (non-idiosyncratic) random shocks drawn from
a known distribution, and in which population is expected to grow by virtue of a
steady inﬂow of immigrants from the outside world. We formalise a situation in which
households are prevented from freely borrowing against their future income and are
required to observe a positive or zero limit to the amount of wealth that they can carry
over from one period to the next. This approach sidesteps the determinants of market
prices and asks directly how a primitive agent would allocate resources through its own
consumption choices and the policies of a benevolent ﬁscal authority.
The tradeoﬀ faced by agents which underlies the analytical framework of this paper
can be summarised as follows. At time zero, a single inﬁnitely lived “native household”,
which optimises its intertemporal utility with no concern for the welfare of any future
generations of newcomers, is called upon to decide what share of current public debt
should be repaid by itself and what share could be oﬄoaded onto future generations
of taxpayers in whose welfare it has no interest. In other words, we imagine that at
date zero a benign government asks the single native household what is the level at
which debt per capita should be stabilised. Faced with this choice, the native household
perceives a tradeoﬀ. Under a low-debt stabilisation option, the native household would
insure itself against income shortfalls in periods of distress. In choosing to stabilise at a
low level of debt, however, it would have to pay an excess tax under favourable economic
conditions compared to future generations in order to reduce the level of liabilities. This
tradeoﬀ constitutes the analytical basis for our methodological approach to ﬁnding the
optimal amount of debt chosen by the government on behalf of the household at the
3dawn of history, in conjunction with the optimal degree of response of taxes to realised
income conditions. We consider the latter degree of cyclical response as a measure of
the automatic stabilisation built into ﬁscal policy in our model. We provide both a local
and a global measure of these two variables. The former solution entails a conditional
optimum, i.e. the values that the government would choose conditional on an initial
inherited debt level; whereas the latter solution entails the unconditional solution.
We prove that, if no exogenous deﬁcit limits are enforced, there is a high comple-
mentarity between these two dimensions of policy considered, namely optimal debt and
optimal built-in stabilisation. The higher the degree of built-in stabilisation, the higher
the level at which the government would choose to stabilise debt. At the limit, if taxes
were designed to adjust in a way to entirely cushion households’ income against adverse
shocks in the absence of a deﬁcit limit the government would choose to stabilise the
debt at the level inherited from history and the native household would thus bear no
excess liability. The intuition we provide is simple. Cutting debt is one way to insure
the household against adverse income realisations, because it amounts to reducing the
tax that is paid on average to sustain it. However, boosting the degree to which the
tax structure can act to absorb realised income shortfalls ex post, no matter how large
the tax is on average, is another – and more eﬃcient – way to provide insurance via
the ﬁscal structure. If asked, households would always prefer the latter over the for-
mer. In contrast, if allowed to choose optimal automatic stabilisation along with the
optimal amount of debt in a world without government deﬁcit limits, agents would
choose to fully insure themselves via automatic stabilisation and consequently forfeit
any reduction in public debt.
We then consider the case in which ﬁscal authorities are subject to borrowing limits
of some sort – in the vein of Bertola and Drazen (1993) – either explicitly via rules gov-
erning public ﬁnances or implicitly via, for instance, credit rationing of international
ﬁnancial markets. In order to make this case concrete, we consider the situation in
which there is an exogenously set limit to the allowable amount of government borrow-
ing. Here we show that the native household, while still perceiving built-in stabilisation
and debt as strict complements, is faced with a trade-oﬀ. The stronger the automatic
decline in taxes in the midst of an economic slump the larger the deﬁcit in bad income
conditions. However, a higher cyclical component in the primary surplus requires a
lower interest bill if the deﬁcit limit is to be respected in all circumstances. A lower
interest bill, in turn, implies a lower average level of debt. Hence, we conclude that a
deﬁcit limit provides a technological device by which higher private income protection
by means of automatic budgetary stabilisation can be purchased only by paying a price
in terms of debt reduction. If the native household wants more of the former, it has to
agree to a debt abatement scheme that reduces the amount of debt held on average.
This trade-oﬀ induced by the deﬁcit limit allows – contrary to the no-deﬁcit limit case
– for the optimisation problem of the government to lead to interior solutions for the
two variables of interest.
In order to gain some insights into the economics of deﬁcit-constraining regimes
such as Europe’s, we analyse the impact of the deﬁcit constraint of the Stability and
Growth Pact on our model. In so doing, we argue that the 3% deﬁcit limit of the
Stability and Growth Pact has indeed priced automatic stabilisation in terms of debt
reduction. This interpretation is consistent with some anecdotal evidence over the rate
at which debt has been reduced in the course of the last decade across various European
countries. According to our model, countries facing larger ﬂuctuations in output have
a strong incentive to choose a large automatic stabilisation to cushion against income
shortfalls. At the same time, given the deﬁcit limit, they are forced to choose a lower
level of steady state debt. Indeed, some positive evidence supports this conjecture.
4The issue of smoothing consumption across states of nature via government in-
volvement is also examined by Flod´ en (2001), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and
Woodford (1990), although the context is slightly diﬀerent, as is the trade-oﬀ they
exploit. On the one hand, increasing debt crowds out capital and means that more
taxes have to be paid over agents’ lifetimes, which entails adverse welfare implications
on long-term consumption opportunities. On the other hand, however, an increase
in debt loosens agents’ borrowing constraints by enhancing their liquidity. Building
upon Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Woodford (1990), Flod´ en (2001) moves to
explicitly treat public transfers which can act as a substitute for debt holdings as con-
sumption smoothers. Whereas their trade-oﬀ is predicated on the assumption of a
closed economy, our model involves a debt market in an open economy, where agents
hold debt instruments issued by creditors in the foreign sector. In so doing, our paper
abstracts from the liquidity-enhancing implications of holding debt – for agents are
allowed to hold liquid foreign assets, whose price is determined exogenously in foreign
markets. In addition, we abstract from the debt-induced crowding-out of physical cap-
ital, as our model involves an endowment economy with no capital. Hence, rather than
examining the role of government debt in easing liquidity constraints in an economy
with heterogeneous agents, we examine the role of automatic stabilisation in insuring
consumers against income shortfalls in an economy with purely aggregative shocks.
This induces a trade-oﬀ diﬀerent from the other studies, insofar as agents must bal-
ance the substantial costs of debt reduction against the reality that high debt – which
has no liquidity-enhancing properties in this model – equates a higher core tax payable
which detracts from agents’ consumption.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model:
ﬁrst the individual household problem and its solution in Section 2.1, then the design
of the government sector in Section 2.2. With respect to the latter, Subsections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2 outline the ﬁscal framework underlying our model. Section 2.3 then con-
tains the implications of this ﬁscal framework for the household problem and optimal
consumption. At this stage, we are able to move to discuss the ﬁscal policy problem
which the government solves optimally – ﬁrst in the absence of any formal deﬁcit limit
in Section 3, then in the case where deﬁcit limits apply in Section 4. In Section 5
we discuss an application of our theoretical framework to European countries in the
context of the Stability and Growth Pact, presenting the main empirical results of the
paper in Section 5.2. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 The native household problem
We consider a non-monetary open economy originally populated by just one inﬁnitely
lived household – or, equivalently, a continuum of such households with measure unity.
This household is indicated in what follows as the “native” household. The economy is
expected to receive a steady inﬂow of equally immortal immigrants from time one on-
wards, with each newcomer identical to the native household – in measure, preferences
and initial wealth. Households do not grow in measure once settled in the economy
and, at the start of each period, are endowed with the same amount of a non-durable
consumption good, which ﬂuctuates randomly around a stationary level y¤. Hence,
resident population growth is entirely driven by the constant rate of immigration, n,
which is also equal to the growth rate of trend output. Since the model is one of in-
ﬁnitely lived agents, following Weil (1989), a “household” in the model can probably be
best thought of as consisting of members of all the diﬀerent generations of a dynasty.
5Implicitly, the model assumes that the diﬀerent generations of a dynasty are linked
by an operative chain of bequests and, therefore, focuses only on total family income,
wealth, consumption and welfare – where the concept of “household” is obviously more
broadly deﬁned than in the data.
Time is discrete and at the beginning of each period the endowment of each resident
household receives the same shock as anybody else’s, so that aggregate endowment
ﬂuctuations are the only source of private income uncertainty within the economy.1






















where ct is real consumption, ± the individual net rate of time preference, gj the random
discrepancy between the actual realisation of individual endowment at time j, yj, and
its time-invariant “normal” level, y¤. Gj ´ G(gj j g0;g1;:::;gj¡1) denotes the (known)
distribution function of the history of such random discrepancies between any future
time j and present time t. The integral on the right-hand side of (1) denotes the
expected utility at any time j conditional on the entire history of endowment shocks.
In what follows, we label gt the “output gap” at time t and impose on it a simple
autoregressive law of motion:
gt = ½gt¡1 + et (2)
where et are iid drawings from a known uniform distribution deﬁned over the com-
pact symmetric support [¡e;+e], yielding a corresponding, proportional compact sym-
metric support [¡²;+²] for gt, with ² being the interval’s positive ﬁnite upper bound.2
0 · ½ · 1 measures persistence. Notice that, as all households are identical in prefer-
ences and endowment possibilities, and hence subject to the same random shocks ²t,
gt stands for both the individual and the aggregate output gaps at time t.
The absence of idiosyncratic shocks to individual endowments has two key implica-
tions for our modelling strategy. Firstly, since all residents choose to self-insure against
the same kind of aggregate uncertainty at the same time, there is no need to allow for a
domestic capital market. In fact, such a market would not be operative at all, as there
would be no scope for risk pooling among citizens operating in the same economy, while
there would always be a domestic demand for foreign claims to ﬁnance a less variable
proﬁle of consumption relative to national income. Secondly, locating transactions in
ﬁnancial claims “outside the boundaries” of the economy introduces a “natural” dimen-
sion of market incompleteness: that related to asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers in uncollateralised international consumption loans. In other words, it
becomes natural under such circumstances to assume that domestic households, while
having unlimited access to a world capital market in one-period lending contracts,
nevertheless face a borrowing limit which precludes bankruptcy with probability one.
Following the lead of Schechtman and Escudero (1977), Hayashi (1982), Hubbard and
Judd (1986, 1987), along with Krusell and Smith (1998), we implement such a re-
striction in its most extreme version, by imposing an outright non–negative wealth
1In reality, of course, microeconomic income processes are very diﬀerent from their macroeconomic ag-
gregates, so that while individuals share in the general growth, the variance in their earnings is dominated
by idiosyncratic components.
2A uniform distribution is chosen purely for analytical ease, although it should be noted that in any case,
the uniform asymptotically converges in probability to the standard normal. While extreme shocks are less
likely under a uniform distribution when compared with a normal, the qualitative results concerning high-
versus low-volatility cases are unaltered.
6condition. While econometric evidence lends support to the conjecture that agents
might be prevented from borrowing as much as they would like to smooth consump-
tion, our characterisation of this friction has been widely canvassed in the literature
as a ﬁrst approximation to reality and seems to entail no serious loss of generality.3
As it is argued in the remainder of the paper, this form of market friction, coupled
with the government’s ability, under certain conditions, to access the international ﬁ-
nancial market on behalf of its citizens, lends a key role to government as a ﬁnancial
intermediary.
At the beginning of each period, after observing the current shock to individual
endowments, resident household(s) must decide how much to consume and how many
ﬁnancial claims to purchase or sell in the international capital market. A ﬁnancial
claim costs one consumption good and entitles its owner to (1 + r) goods next period,
with n < r < ±. 4 Consumption and accumulation decisions are made to satisfy an
inﬁnite set of period ﬂow budget constraints,
ct (gt) + wt ¡ (y¤ + gt) + st ¡ wt¡1(1 + r) + kt · 0; 8t ¸ 0 (3)
and an inﬁnite set of contemporary borrowing constraints,
wt ¸ 0; 8t ¸ 0 (4)
for some predetermined w¡1: In (3) and (4), wt¡1 and wt denote real outside assets
carried over from the earlier period and into the next period, respectively, y¤ + gt is
the realised level of individual endowment at time t, st is a universal real tax paid by
the entire population present at time t, and kt is a non-negative real tax that is equal
to zero for everybody except the native household. For simplicity, we assume a ﬁxed
exchange rate.
After observing the realisation of the endowment shock in the ﬁrst period, the native
household draws up its contingent plan for non-negative consumption and lending in
such a way as to maximise its lifetime utility (1) subject to the inﬁnite succession
of time budget and borrowing restrictions (3) and (4), for any arbitrary ﬁscal plan
characterised by the series fst; kt; t ¸ 0g. The generalised Euler condition associated
with our native household’s individual optimisation problem at any time t can be
written in the following compact form:5
U0 (ct(gt)) = max
·





; 8t ¸ 0
(5)
with ¯ standing for the ratio between the gross rate of time preference and the gross
rate of interest prevailing in the capital market, i.e. ¯ = 1+±
1+r (with 1 < ¯ < 1 + r)6,
3A more general setting, allowing agents to accumulate a limited amount of net ﬁnancial liabilities, is
studied by Clarida (1987) and Aiyagari (1994). Aiyagari, in particular, argues that present-value budget
balance and a non-negativity condition on individual consumption together imply a borrowing restriction,
although the limit imposed on the period holdings of wealth would be less tight than ours in that agents
would generally be allowed to borrow some positive amount of resources.
4Clarida (1990) proves that, in a multi-country general equilibrium model whereby each economy’s ag-
gregate income is subject to random shocks and individuals are borrowing-constrained, the interest rate
prevailing in the international ﬁnancial market is constant in the stationary state and strictly less than the
rate of time preference of the least impatient country. In what follows, for the reasons spelled out below, we
assume r < ±.
5See, for example, Deaton (1991).
6The condition that ¯ < 1 + r is needed in order to guarantee that the present value of the expected
stream of dated consumption is bounded away from inﬁnity.
7and U0 (c(gt)) representing the marginal utility of consumption at some generic time
t. Clearly, at the decision juncture t = 0, if individual borrowing from international
capital markets is ruled out, consumption at time zero can be no higher than the
contemporary amount of spendable resources, y¤ + g0 ¡ (s0 + k0) + (1 + r)w¡1, given
by the sum of the after-tax income realised at zero, y¤ +g0 ¡(s0 +k0), and the wealth
carried over from the past compounded at the prevailing real interest rate, (1+r)w¡1. If
consumption cannot fall short of spendable resources, marginal utility cannot be higher
than U0 (y¤ + g0 ¡ (s0 + k0) + (1 + r)w¡1), i.e. the marginal utility index evaluated at
the quantity of current spendable resources. Hence, the borrowing constraint will
bind at zero if marginal utility evaluated at y¤ + g0 ¡ (s0 + k0) + (1 + r)w¡1 exceeds
the anticipated discounted marginal utility at any future period, whose expectation
is conditional on the current realisation of income. Otherwise, the current and the
expected marginal utilities are equated in the usual way.
Schechtman and Escudero (1977), Clarida (1987) and Deaton and Laroque (1992)
prove that, under a number of mild conditions on U (and ± > r), the optimisation
problem admits a solution. However, the set of generalised Euler conditions identiﬁed
by (5) generally does not yield a closed-form law of motion for consumption, not even
under fairly simple functional specialisations of utility. The problem lies, of course, in
the presence of borrowing restrictions. The inability to access a frictionless market for
consumption loans adds a “kink” to the expectations operator used in the intertemporal
marginal condition – the second term on the right-hand side of (5) – in that expectations
of future marginal utilities have to be formed by taking in due account the possibility
that borrowing restrictions might sooner or later become binding. This, as emphasised
by Carroll (2001a and 2001b), Deaton (1991) and Aiyagari (1994), augments the degree
of prudence – that is, as deﬁned in Kimball (1990), households’ tendency to frontload
saving in anticipation of future hardships – as compared to a scenario contemplating
the same risk preferences but no borrowing restrictions. However, there is no closed
analytical form capturing the degree to which this eﬀect impact on consumption relative
to a situation in which borrowing is unlimited and the household can consume at the
prescribed life-cycle optimum.
In the remainder of this study we tackle the complexity of the problem just men-
tioned in a twofold manner. First, we specialise the period utility to a quadratic
function of consumption, with the bliss point indicated by C:
U(ct) = ¡(C ¡ ct)2 (6)
This representation of preferences allows, in a complete-market framework that is in
the absence of borrowing limits, a simple closed-form solution to the optimisation prob-
lem under uncertainty, namely that implied by the application of the certainty equiva-
lence principle.7 Quadratic utilities are notoriously scarcely appealing as a description
of consumers’ behaviour towards risk, as they imply an increasing willingness to pay
to avoid a given bet as wealth increases. However, coupled with borrowing-constrained
agents, precautionary saving takes place even in the quadratic utility case, as shown by
Carroll and Kimball (2001). Since our main result – that non-altruistic agents would
choose to purchase insurance by means of costly debt reduction – is strongly depen-
dent on agents’ attitude towards risk, and would be induced by preferences displaying
a high degree of prudence, we chose to minimise this analytical bias by downplaying
precautionary saving somewhat. We call the solution to this linear-quadratic problem
in the absence of borrowing constraints the permanent-income optimum.
7See, for example, Hall (1978), Hayashi (1985), Abel (1990) and, in a model of ﬁscal adjustment, Bertola
and Drazen (1993). Blanchard and Mankiw (1988) review the arguments in favour of more plausible ap-
proaches to the formalisation of preferences.
8Secondly, we approximate the optimal solution to the linear-quadratic problem
facing households in the presence of borrowing restrictions by the following rule of
thumb. Households would try to consume at their permanent-income optimum, un-
less prevented from doing so by a lack of suﬃcient spendable resources, that is unless
y¤ + g0 ¡ (s0 + k0) + (1 + r)w¡1 is less than needed to ﬁnance the life-cycle con-
sumption level at time zero. In technical terms, households maximise their quadratic
utility (6) with respect to consumption taking into account the whole succession of
ﬂow budget constraints (3), t ¸ 0, and the contemporary borrowing restriction w1 ¸ 0,
but ignoring the fact that borrowing restrictions may come to bind in the future, con-
straining w2; w3, etc. also to be above zero. This amounts to having households solve
the intertemporal Euler condition in (5) with the rightmost one-period-ahead expecta-
tion operator censored over the interval in which the income realisation is suﬃciently
favourable (i.e., the output gap g1is large enough) to allow a consumption level in
excess of total spendable resources. In this way, households draw up their consump-
tion plans as if they were subject to a borrowing restriction in the period of decision
– as apparent from the former term in the max operator of (5) – but no borrowing
restriction were anticipated to bite in the future. 8
Our rule of thumb can be represented in the following cut-oﬀ representation:
c¤
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¡² (sj + kj)dGj;
if y¤ + gt + (1 + r)wt¡1 ¡ (st + kt) ¸ cPI
t
cB
t = y¤ + gt + (1 + r)wt¡1 ¡ (st + kt);
if y¤ + gt + (1 + r)wt¡1 ¡ (st + kt) < cPI
t
(8)
First, notice that, since (6) admits a bliss (or saturation) point for period consump-
tion, at an optimum consumption – at any date t – cannot exceed C. This explains
the Min operator in (7). Secondly, the renewal process formulated in (8) captures our
simple rule of thumb, in that the household sets a target for period consumption equal
to its permanent-income optimal choice, i.e. cPI
t , which in turn is equal to the annuity
value of the sum of ﬁnancial wealth and the expected present discounted value of future
take-home income. Section A of the Appendix provides the details of the analytical
expression for cPI
t . If disposable resources at time t, y¤+gt +(1+r)wt¡1¡(st+kt), are
large enough to allow for the ﬁnancing of cPI
t , it consumes cPI
t and saves the diﬀerence
between current resources and target consumption. Otherwise, it sets its consumption
at cB
t , equal to its entire current resources – driving its wealth to zero. In this way,
at any t, there exists a unique critical value cPI
t , such that, for draws of income bad
8Our rule-of-thumb appears to be a quite accurate approximation to the exact solution implied by (3), (4),
and (5). To check the accuracy of our approximation we ﬁrst solved for the exact consumption function as
computed from the algorithm of Deaton (1991) using the programs of Carroll (2001). Then we computed the
proposed rule-of-thumb. In the case of a quadratic utility function the distance between the two functions in
the region in which they diﬀer –for values of total resources before the kink– for a ﬁne grid of values of total
resources, was on average a 2.8% of consumption. In the case of another class of utility function, namely a
CES function with risk aversion parameter of two, the distance between both functions was somewhat larger
but never exceeded an 8% of the value of consumption obtained with the exact solution.
9enough to make spendable resources fall short of cPI
t , the household decides to spend
everything it has on hand and enter the next period with zero assets; conversely, for re-
alised spendable resources exceeding cPI
t , something of the cash currently on hand will
be held over and carried forward into the next period, and current consumption will be
lower than spendable resources at zero. It is apparent that this consumption schedule
displays a high sensitivity of consumption to even transitory earnings innovations over
the liquidity-constrained region – that is, the marginal propensity to consume out of
an even non-permanent income innovation is one. Notice that our assumption that
households are relatively impatient and unpersuaded by the rewards of waiting (i.e.
¯ > 1) guarantees that the current value – at time zero – of the expected marginal
utility at an inﬁnitely distant time converges to zero almost surely. As discussed in
Aiyagari (1994), this condition is necessary – but not suﬃcient – in order to bound the
household’s accumulated assets away from inﬁnity at some distant point in the future.9
In the remainder of the paper we imagine that the native household enters period zero
with zero wealth, i.e. w¡1 = 0:
2.2 The government sector
The policy problem facing the ﬁscal authority in this economy is that of deciding – at
time zero – over the level at which the debt-to-population ratio should be stabilised in
the long run, as well as the degree of automatic stabilisation embedded in the budget.
We will assume that the government is a benevolent planner that chooses the level of
public debt and the degree of automatic stabilisation of the budget by maximising the
utility of the native household, and is subject to a budget constraint so that it has to
guarantee the value of the debt-to-population ratio.
At time zero the government starts out with an inherited debt – held on behalf
of the native household – which carries the value b0 in terms of consumption good.
This debt is denominated in one-period risk-free real bonds issued on the international
capital market. Since the size of the population at date zero is normalised to one, b0
stands for both total and per-capita real public liabilities at the start of history. In
order to back the current level of debt, b0, in order to preserve stationarity in the future






(bt¡1 ¡ st¡1); (9)
the government has to commit to an inﬁnite series of net taxes – revenue minus










According to (10) the government must identify an inﬁnite succession of per-capita
primary surpluses st that can guarantee systematic coverage of the interest payments
due on bt, given the expected rate of population growth n, thus keeping its real per
capita burden suﬃciently close, on average, to its long-term stabilisation level b0:10
9Clarida (1987) establishes that, even under ¯ > 1, the process of wealth accumulation can be explosive if
households’ rate of relative risk aversion is not uniformly bounded. A prominent example of such preferences
is the exponential utility function.
10Condition (10) stems from solving forward the ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation describing the law of motion





(bt¡1 ¡ st¡1), and imposing the usual no-Ponzi-game condition that rules
out explosive paths of deﬁcit ﬁnancing. Instead of just imposing the no-Ponzi-game condition, we will specify
one process for st such that the transversality condition for debt holdings is respected.
10Notice that in this case, all generations of taxpayers – the native household and all the
successive generations of immigrants from their respective time of settlement onwards –
are called upon to shoulder a uniform amount of real debt b0: solvency and (stochastic)
stationarity thus impose that this amount be backed by the present discounted value of
the whole stream of taxes (or, equivalently, per-capita primary surpluses) st that each
resident – whether native or immigrant – will have to pay over its lifetime.
In order to fully specify the government sector in this economy, in the remainder of
this Section before specifying the government optimisation problem, we will ﬁrst specify
the composition of public debt, and then the law of motion of st that guarantees that
(10) holds.
2.2.1 Partitioning public debt
Before entering the formal deﬁnition of the government problem, and for the sake
of presentational clarity, assume that the policy decision of the government were to
stabilise at some level b¤ < b0. Since the level at which stabilisation is eﬀected, b¤,
identiﬁes the real burden of debt that the government is going to assign, upon entry,
to each of the successive generations of immigrants entering the country from time one
onwards, and since default is ruled out, stabilising at some b¤ < b0 means that the
native household will have to be held liable for covering the diﬀerence between b0 and
b¤. We shall call b¤ the kernel or universal debt.
In formulae, the native household’s inherited burden of debt at zero, b0, would be
partitioned into two shares according to the following accounting condition:

















The former fraction of the debt borne by the native dynasty at zero , b¤ in (11)
– would be the real burden which the native taxpayer would share with each future
generation of newcomers. Again, solvency and stationarity would impose that this







¡² st dGt, i.e. the expected discounted
value of the universal taxes (or primary surpluses) to be paid by all residents – whether
native or immigrant – at any generic time t, paying due attention to the expectation of
an expanding tax base (which justiﬁes n in the compounding factor). By construction,
the second fraction of the debt burden weighing upon the native household at zero, ¯ k,
would not be backed by the inﬁnite stream of universal taxes st, and thus it would not
be borne by any taxpayer other than the native one. Consequently, it would have to







¡² kt dGt of the anticipated
excess taxes kt levied on the ﬁrst generation alone until debt reaches its optimal value:
this justiﬁes the absence of n from the numerator of the compounding factor.
In any case, the real public debt burden weighing upon the native household, b¤








t ¡ st), with the initial condition b¤






with s¤ denoting – further elucidated in (12) below – the primary surplus run in the
absence of shocks to output, when all previous cyclical inﬂuences have abated.11 The



















with T < 1 in the manner outlined in the next subsection.










(bt ¡ st) when st = s¤ and bt = b¤ 8t.
112.2.2 The law of motion of net taxes
In order to cut down on the dimensionality of the policy space, we will restrict the
search for a policy optimum to the sequences of dated contingent taxes fst; kt; t ¸ 0g
satisfying the linear restrictions posited by the following Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 – We assume that the taxation variables st and kt in (10) and (11)
obey:
st(gt) = s¤ + agt + r(b¤




y¤ + gt ¡ c¤
t(gt) ¡ st(gt); y¤ + gt ¡ st(gt) ¸ c¤
t(gt)
0; y¤ + gt ¡ st(gt) < c¤
t(gt)
(13)
Equation (12) renders, in a standard linear fashion,12 two key features of a modern
ﬁscal regime operating in a stationary stochastic context. Firstly, it captures the built-
in countercyclical features of modern budgets, whereby gross revenues typically rise –
and/or primary expenditures accruing to individual citizens decline – as the realised
output gap widens. This income-induced fraction of taxes is represented by agt, where
a measures the sensitivity of the individual (and aggregate) net tax liabilities to the
individual (and aggregate) output gap.13 Secondly, (12) incorporates the condition
that, in a stochastic steady state, the sequence of current and future primary surpluses
must ensure that the present discounted value of current and future revenues used to
sustain debt satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint – as formulated
in (10) or (11) at each point in time – not only at time zero – that is, for all initial
debt stocks and following aggregate shocks of all possible magnitudes. (12) does so
by centering the primary surplus around a long-term norm s¤ univocally linked with





b¤ – and by imposing a self-correcting
mechanism that ensures systematic mean reversion once the shocks hitting the economy
have abated – via r(b¤
t ¡b¤). Whenever taxes are residually determined at each point in
time to satisfy the government solvency constraint, this contingent (closed-loop) rule
can be assumed to hold, and vice versa.
Condition (13), for its part, posits an “opportunistic” scheme for the time distri-










> 0 – i.e. provided that the excess debt ¯ k established at the
start of history was strictly positive, and that it has not yet been repaid – at any
generic t the tax due by the native taxpayer against its excess debt obligation ¯ k will
be calibrated in a way to extract no more than the diﬀerence between its time-t re-
alised disposable income – net of the universal tax st(gt) levied on all residents – and
the optimal consumption target deﬁned by (7). A scheme of this sort is opportunistic
in that the government takes advantage of “good” states of nature – when the native
household’s disposable resources suﬃce to ﬁnance at least c¤(gt) as in the upper section
12Buiter (1998) proposes a rule similar to (12) in a model of ﬁscal policy and price determination. In
terms of policymaking, rule (12) is identical to the one which has been used in the past by the European
Commission to assess the risks of a country breaching the 3% Maastricht Treaty deﬁcit limit; another way
of expressing the rule is dt = d¤ + a gt, where d stands for public deﬁcit. For an interpretation of this rule
in the framework of an optimal solution to the problem of a Ramsey Planner, see Section 3.
13In a broader analytical context than the one presented in this paper, a condition similar to (12) would
endogenously ﬂow from the policy optimisation problem rather than being imposed as an institutional
foundation of the policy process itself. The literature on the optimality of deﬁcit rules reminiscent of (12)
– whereby governments run a surplus in “good times” and a deﬁcit in “bad times” – is too vast to be
summarised here. As a prominent recent example see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994).
12of (13) – to tax income heavily, in order to temporarily lift the excess tax in periods in
which the household is liquidity constrained – as in the lower section. The importance
of the opportunistic scheme for the solution of our problem will become clear later in
the following Section.
2.3 Implications of ﬁscal policy for consumption
The following Lemma reveals the impact of the diﬀerent assumptions made in (11),
(12), and (13) for the native household’s consumption function at zero in good and
bad income conditions.
Lemma 1 – For any given b0, if liquidity constraints do not bind, consumption is
an increasing function of the level at which stabilisation occurs, b¤; conversely, under
binding liquidity constraints, consumption is a negative function of b¤. The likelihood
of the household ﬁnding itself borrowing constrained increases with b¤. At t = 0 the
















[nb¤ ¡ rb0] + o(g0); g0 ¸ Γ0
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¡ b0(1 + r ¡ ¯)
¸
(15)
where o(g0) is a term in the realised output gap of a second order of magnitude and
A =
³





Proof. Use (12), (13), (11), the initial condition for the kernel debt, b¤













¡² (sj + kj)dGj and st + kt from (8). This
yields a new cutoﬀ rule for individual consumption, with both cPI
t and cB
t expressed
as functions of b¤. In order to make the threshold for disposable resources y¤ + gt ¡
st +wt(1+r) < cPI
t – below which consumption switches analytical forms – a function
of the realised output gap at time t, substitute the new expression for cPI
t into it and
collect terms in gt. Finally, particularise at time t = 0 and recall that we assume
w¡1 = 0. [c.q.d.]
Notice that the previous expression is valid for each time t, and not only for time
zero. Notice also that, under any reasonable parameterisation relevant to this paper,
coeﬃcient A can be safely approximated to unity. In what follows, we shall therefore
assume A = 1.
Within a dynastic model with borrowing constraints, like the one we use, the result
of the Lemma is hardly surprising. Imagine, for the time being, as in Weil (1989), a
frictionless world, where agents are never prevented from consuming at their preferred
permanent-income level cPI
t (g0). Provided the consumer is moderately impatient (i.e.
1 · ¯ < 1+r), and assuming a positive anticipated rate of population growth n, agents
would not be indiﬀerent as to the level of debt at which stabilisation occurs: they would
gain from a policy that stabilises at a “high” b¤, as cPI
0 is a positive function of b¤. This
anti-Modigliani-Miller feature is simply a reﬂection of the basic non-Ricardianness of a
framework where eternal dynasties overlap without motives for mutual altruism. If the
population is expected to be sustained by a positive stream of immigrants (i.e. n > 0),
13oﬄoading more of b0 onto these aliens becomes an attractive choice for the native
household living in a world of complete markets. This result is similar in spirit to that
recently discussed by Ireland (2001) in the same analytical context augmented by the
presence of money. Likewise, Detken (1999), using a Weil model in a similar context,
ﬁnds that with its non-Ricardian properties, ﬁscal policy eﬀectiveness is enhanced if
governments maintain budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus.
Now introduce frictions into the credit market and the need to switch from cPI
t (g0)
to cB
t (g0) under suﬃciently bad income conditions. When borrowing restrictions bind,
as apparent from the lower section of (14), having to pay a lower tax on average, s¤ – i.e.





s¤ – would be most valuable,
as under such conditions the marginal propensity to consume out of a tax cut would
be one. Therefore, when the household is prevented from consuming at its preferred
level because of credit market imperfections, a policy of low debt stabilisation would
appear the most advantageous. Again, the notion that the timing – and the scale –
of taxation does matter when households are prevented from borrowing freely mirrors
earlier results in the Ramsey-problem literature. See, for example, Barsky, Mankiw
and Zeldes (1986).
Notice also two features about the threshold Γ0. Firstly that, as ¯ ! 1+, Γ0 is
never positive and entirely driven by the diﬀerence between b0 and b¤. A status-quo
solution to the stabilisation choice (one in which b¤ = b0) would thus entail Γ0 = 0,
and it would consequently put the threshold of income under which the household feels
borrowing constrained at y¤, average income. This result replicates Deaton’s (1991)
simulations on optimal cutoﬀ rules under diﬀerent utility speciﬁcations. Secondly, as
¯ ! 1+, if b¤ < b0, then Γ0 · 0. Hence, with liquidity constraints, stabilising at a b¤
lower than b0 – although costly – can make the bad occurrence less likely and alleviate
the hardship when it occurs. Likewise, boosting the sensitivity of the budget to the
income gap has the intuitive advantage of pushing the gap threshold more into negative
territory, thus alleviating the probability of incurring borrowing constraints.
In conclusion, (14) points to the fundamental tension existing between the policy
preferences that the native household would advance under a good and a bad state,
respectively. If the native household – or the government on its behalf – were to express
its preferences over the split of b0 into b¤ and k after having received a “good” draw of
income (with g0 such that Γ0 · g0 · ²), it would decide to set k to zero and to oﬄoad
as much debt as possible to future generations. By contrast, if it were to express its
preferences under a bad income draw, it would vote for as low a b¤ as it would be
compatible with the feasibility constraints facing the policy decision14.
Now we are in a condition to formally pose the government problem.
3 The government problem in the absence of a
deﬁcit limit
Policy decisions over the relevant ﬁscal variables are taken at the beginning of period
zero, on behalf of the only household resident at that time and before anybody (native
agent or ﬁscal authority) can observe the realisation of the contemporary endowment
shock, g0. Thus the government ranks stabilisation levels for the debt-to-population
ratio and the associated time-sequences of (possibly) contingent tax schedules fst; kt ¸
14It is worth noticing that expression (14) depends not only on the current draw of the output gap us
such, but on all the future expected draws of the gap that are summarised in the coeﬃcient in brackets before
g0 by virtue of the recursive structure of the problem and the assumed uniform distribution for the shocks
aﬀecting the output gap.
140; t ¸ 0g on the basis of a criterion function provided by the lifetime indirect utility
of the native household, determined by (6). To make the problem non-trivial, we
implicitly disallow conﬁscatory taxes on accumulated wealth and immigrants’ incomes.
After the fully credible policy plan has been announced, the native household gets to
decide over its preferred intertemporal allocation of consumption. In short, we focus
on the beginning of history, time zero, when only the native dynasty is resident in the
country and all policy decisions take place.
Naturally, there are time consistency pitfalls to the policy exercise, in particular
questions pertaining to the degree to which governments can credibly commit to a
policy whose target moves over time. If the government were allowed to re-optimise
at some later date t ¸ 1 before the native household had fully repaid its excess debt
burden k, the mere anticipation of this later action by the native household at time
zero would suﬃce to distort its policy preferences at the same point of history and
the whole policy exercise outline above would thereby unravel. This is why we impose
that the government be capable of ﬁrmly committing itself to a detailed set of actions
and be prevented from deviating and reneging on previous promises at any future
date.15 After making the founding decision, the ﬁscal authority is entirely conﬁned
to the implementation of the policy plan established at the start of history. This
mainly involves the collection of taxes from national taxpayers and the transfer of the
relative proceeds to the international holders of national bonds as interest payment
and – at times of income adversity – it may encompass the channelling of credit from
outside capital markets to borrowing-constrained national residents in the codiﬁed form
outlined below (in condition (12)).
Deﬁnition 1 – We deﬁne an optimum for the debt ratio and the budget sensi-









t(gt )]dGt by choice of alternative sta-
bilisation options b¤ (implying ¯ k = b0 ¡b¤) and budget sensitivities 0 · a¤ · 1, with
c¤
t(gt ) > 0 given by (14).









where consumption is conditional on b0.














Assumption 2 – We assume that the government policy choice is made under
steady state conditions, i.e. with g¡1 = 0: Also, for ease of exposition and in order to
suppress notational clutter, assume ¯ ! 1+.16
The set up of our welfare optimisation problem poses two sorts of issues related to
the objective of the government’s benign care and to the set of attainable policy options.
On the former note, it is fair to say that identifying the policy objective function with
the lifetime utility of the native household alone amounts to raising the latter to the
15Time inconsistency can be a serious drawback of models, as signalled by Calvo (1978), Lucas and Stokey
(1983), or Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer (2001). Nevertheless the solution to the government problem we
obtain is time consistent insofar as the ﬁscal rule in (12) represents a full commitment technology. Therefore,
the government at time zero solves the problem under the presumption that it has the ability to commit to
all its future policies, and the households internalise this presumption through the announced commitment
technology. The ﬁscal rule in (12) can also be considered as a linear approximation to the optimal solution
of the problem of a Ramsey planner under full commitment (Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2001);
Marcet and Scott (2001)).
16Results for the case ¯ > 1 are available form the authors upon request.
15status of the representative citizen in this economy. This assumption would no doubt
look arbitrary within a standard overlapping generations model. However, we believe
this identiﬁcation to be warranted in the present context, where the foundations of the
ﬁscal regime for the years to come have – by construction – to be laid down at the start
of history, and where all generations of not-yet resident taxpayers at time zero bear
no connection to the native resident. On the latter point, concerning the admissible
policy set, notice that we do not impose model closure conditions on the government
optimisation problem, as stated in Deﬁnition 1. This condition would simply state
that the ex-post diﬀerence between realised income and optimal consumption at any
date explains the change in the country’s net asset position. However, within this
partial equilibrium model such a condition of feasibility of foreign current transactions,
provided the government and the household budget constraints are satisﬁed, is simply
an identity.
Our problem admits two kinds of solutions. The local solution is deﬁned as a set Ω¤
that solves the constrained optimisation exercise given the initial debt inherited from
history, b0. The local solution thus answers the following question: what is the value
of b¤and a¤ the government would choose on behalf of the taxpayers, conditional on
starting oﬀ from a given ﬁscal position identiﬁed by b0? In contrast, the global solution
is identiﬁed by a set Ω¤
G which represents the ﬁxed point of the optimum problem. In
other words, conditional on starting oﬀ from a ﬁxed-point couple fb¤
G; a¤
Gg, taxpayers
would not feel any incentive to move in any direction.
The following proposition establishes a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an
interior solution to the government optimisation problem.
Proposition 1 – The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution to
the government optimisation problem is that r > 2n. If this condition is satisﬁed, the
following applies:
(i) If the government treats a as a given in its optimisation problem, the local
optimum for b¤ takes on the following generic form:
b¤ = b0 ¡ Φ(a;²;½jr ¡ n) (16)
with:
Φ(a;²;½jr ¡ n) ¸ 0
Φ(1;²;½jr ¡ n) = Φ(a;0;½jr ¡ n) = Φ(a;²;1jr ¡ n) = Φ(a;²;1j n) = 0
Φ² (a;²;½jr ¡ n) > 0; Φr¡n (½;²;ajr ¡ n) > 0; Φa (a;²;½jr ¡ n); Φ½ (a;²;½jr ¡ n) < 0
where Φi denotes the partial derivative of function Φ with respect to its argument i.
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(ii) If a is a policy choice variable, then:
a¤ = a¤
G = 1 (18)
b¤ = b¤
G = b0
Proof. See Section B of the Appendix.
Lemma 2 in the Appendix reduces the dynamic optimisation problem to its static
counterpart, and makes use of a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion to transform a problem of
16utility maximisation into one in which consumption is being maximised instead. The
resulting necessary conditions for a welfare optimum are the following:
(y¤ ¡ E0 [c0(g0; b¤; aj b¤)])
@E0 [c0(g0; b¤; aj b0)]
@b¤ = 0 (19)
(y¤ ¡ E0 [c0(g0; b¤; aj b¤)])
@E0 [c0(g0; b¤; aj b0)]
@a
= 0 (20)
with the latter one, taken with respect to a, deactivated when the government
treats a as a given, and where E0 [c0(g0; b¤; a)] =
R Γ0
¡² cB
0 (g0; b¤; aj kt(g0))dG0 + R ²
Γ0 cPI
t (g0; b¤; aj kt(g0))dG0. The two conditions simply state that, oﬀ corners, i.e.
provided that the optimisation occurs in the range where the native household’s marginal
utility is positive – when expected consumption still falls short of the saturation point
C, which we normalised to y¤, i.e. E0 [c0(g0; b¤; a)] < C = y¤ – the optimal value
of b¤ (or a) is the one which sets to zero the own derivative of expected consump-
tion – the right hand side of (19) or (20). Otherwise, past the bliss level of expected
consumption, the optimum is nailed down by the left-hand side of (19) or (20), i.e.
E0 [c0(g0; b¤; a)] = C = y¤. The right-side marginal conditions are the ones that pin
down the local optima for b¤ and a, respectively, whereas the expression on the left-
side, when it becomes zero, identiﬁes the global maximum for expected consumption,
and, by implication, expected utility. Figure 1 graphically displays these dynamics of
the solution in Proposition 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Proposition 1 synthesises our results under a ﬁscal regime that features no restric-
tions on the level of the deﬁcit that the government can run period-by-period. It
points to the notion that under such a regime there exist two complementary forms of
government-provided insurance available to the native household against bad luck, i.e.
low consumption when borrowing constraints happen to bite. These two competing
insurance packages can be ranked in utility terms. The ﬁrst, and the more eﬃcient,
package is automatic stabilisation, i.e. the promise of a subsidy a – per each unit of
income shortfall – that households automatically receive from the budget when realised
endowments are below normal levels. A value of a as close to one as possible can both
mitigate the consequences of a bad shock once it occurs – as evident from the lower
section of (14) – and make the bad state less likely to occur in the ﬁrst place – as
apparent from (15).
The second form of self-insurance, when the ﬁrst one is unavailable or restricted,
contemplates the payment of a premium kt(gt) – collected only in good states of nature,
according to (13), and with a present discounted value equal to ¯ k = b0 ¡ b¤ – against
the promise of having the non-contingent fraction of taxes s¤ permanently reduced.
Clearly, the former insurance package dominates the latter, as it can be activated ex
post when income shortfalls eventually materialise.
The complementarity between automatic stabilisation and debt reduction explains
both (16)-(17) and (18). When a is a fully viable policy option, the government – acting
on behalf of the household – is well-advised to “purchase” full coverage in the form
of automatic stabilisation (a¤ = a¤
G = 1) – which can be activated ex post at no cost
– and zero coverage in the alternative form of debt reduction (b¤ = b¤
G = b0), which
requires a cumulative payment of ¯ k: Conversely, when the choice of a is restricted
and so that it is suﬃciently smaller than unity, the native agent is generally ready
to accept a policy of accelerated debt reduction whose cost falls entirely upon itself,
provided the associated payments kt(gt) earmarked against the ¯ k excess obligation are
opportunistically designed, and the growth rate of population is not too large.
17Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the channels through which these two
insurance schemes can cushion consumption against unfavourable income shocks. The
ﬁrst panel shows how an increase in a can be thought of as causing a clockwise rotation
of the two relevant branches of the consumption schedule, thus lifting consumption
levels attainable to the left of its kink marked by Γ0. Γ0 itself gets pushed into more
negative territory as a consequence of the rotation, which itself improves expected
utility as it reduces the perceived likelihood of a bad state. The second panel portrays
the impact of a cut in b¤ as a downward shift in the consumption line applying to the
right of Γ0 and an upward shift of the line applying to the left of Γ0. The crossing
point between the two lines – marking the kink in the overall consumption schedule
and identiﬁed by Γ0 – is unambiguously shifted to the left. This, again, reduces the
perceived riskiness attached to income ﬂuctuations.
Intuitively, the desirability of insurance coverage increases with uncertainty. This
explains why reducing the amplitude of the interval that spans the possible shocks
to the income gap in (2) makes debt reduction a less and less attractive option. Ac-
cordingly, Φ is rising in ² and reaches a minimum of zero as ² ! 0. Finally, income
persistence also is detrimental to prudent behaviour. If ½ is large, a good draw of
income indicates that more good draws are to be expected in the future, thus making
a prudential debt cut less desirable. Since, by assumption, policy decisions are taken
under relatively good income conditions – the steady state – this explains why raising
½ towards unity makes the status quo option b¤ = b0 more attractive.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
4 The government problem with a deﬁcit limit
Most likely, unfettered ﬁscal regimes of the sort considered in the preceding Section
are an abstraction or, at best, a very loose approximation to reality. As conjectured
by Bertola and Drazen (1993), trigger points may exist that restrict the scope for ﬁs-
cal policy decisions when, say, ﬁscal outcomes are subject to ﬁnancial market scrutiny.
Values of government spending – or deﬁcit – to output considered critical by consumers
or market participants may induce discrete stabilisations when they are approached.
Seen from a diﬀerent angle, trigger points may be institutionalised by the imposition
of hard constitutional limits on government borrowing. Europe’s Stability and Growth
Pact is a prominent example of a quasi-constitutional arrangement restricting the ca-
pability of signatory governments to choose a deﬁcit in excess of 3% of output, even
when operating at the trough of serious recessions. Section 5 builds upon this example
more extensively.
To account for these various implicit and explicit constraints, in what follows we
reformulate the policy problem of the preceding Section by imposing an additional
constraint on the government. What will result from this re-optimisation under a deﬁcit
limit is a non-discrete and non-discretionary version of the recurrent deﬁcit cycles of
Bertola and Drazen who explicitly recognise that their model can be re-interpreted as
a model of inﬁnitesimal ﬁscal interventions once the trigger is reached.
Deﬁnition 2 – We deﬁne a deﬁcit constraint as:
Z ²
¡²








+ a²(! ¡ 1) ¡ rb¤ · ¡dmax[y¤ + ²(! ¡ 1)] (22)
where dmax is the maximum deﬁcit allowed by the constraint, and 0 < ! < 1.
The form that we give to the deﬁcit constraint in the steady state deserves further
discussion. One issue concerns how soft the constraint is allowed to be in our model.
Normally, provided it is credible, a deﬁcit limit must be observed in virtually all cir-
cumstances of nature to which a positive probability, no matter how small this might
be, is attached. In our context, such a “hard deﬁcit” regime would dictate that ﬁscal
variables be calibrated so as to insure against a breach of the rule even under the worst
possible realisation of output, no matter how unlikely that is. However, in practice,
credible deﬁcit rules can still leave scope for contingent provisions tolerating breaches
of a deﬁcit limit under particularly unfavourable circumstances.17 Consequently, we
allow for a continuum of degrees to which the rule can be made stringent, depending
on the parameter !. If ! is zero, the deﬁcit limit dmax may not not be violated even
in the case of (per-capita) output being at its worst possible reading of y¤ ¡ ². At
the other extreme of the spectrum of strictness, if, say, ! = 1, overall deﬁcit would
be permitted to be as high as dmax per cent of trend output under zero-output-gap
conditions, which, in turn, would imply that it could end up considerably overshooting
that value in a less favourable output scenario, given its countercyclical properties. In
between these two extremes, we allow for a continuum of output thresholds at which
the escape (or tolerance) clause is triggered, i.e. 0 · ! < 1.








+ a²(! ¡ 1) is the minimum per-capita primary surplus that can be





+ a²(! ¡ 1) ¡rb¤ is the maximum
that the overall deﬁcit can reach without triggering penalties or market reactions.18
Both deﬁcit constraints are calibrated in real per-capita output terms, by multiplying
the deﬁcit threshold dmax by y¤ +²(!¡1), to make them applicable to a setting where
the trigger for deﬁcits is expressed in per cent of trend output.
Deﬁnition 3 – We deﬁne a deﬁcit-constrained optimum for the debt ratio and the
budget sensitivity as the solution to the government problem of maximising the native








t(gt )]dGt by choice of
alternative stabilisation options b¤ (implying ¯ k = b0 ¡ b¤) and budget sensitivities
0 · a¤ · 1, with c¤
t(gt ) > 0 given by (7) and (14), and the steady state per-capita





+ a²(! ¡ 1) ¡ rb¤ restricted by: (22), with some 0 · ! < 1. The
usual characterisations of local and global optima follow from Deﬁnition 1.
Proposition 2 – The local solution to the deﬁcit-constrained optimum problem is
yielded by the solution to the the following sets of ﬁrst order conditions:
17The Stability and Growth Pact, for instance, contains a provision allowing for a deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio in
excess of 3% if it results from an unusual event outside the control of the member state that has a major
impact on the ﬁnancial position of the general government or if it results from a “severe” economic downturn.
18In order to keep complexity at a minimum, we overlook the possibility that a suﬃciently long string of
bad draws of output may inﬂate the mean-reverting term r(b¤
t ¡b¤) in (12). This simpliﬁcation can make our
calibration of the deﬁcit constraint by the conditions prevailing over the steady state too lax. As a partial
compensation to this bias, when simulating ﬁscal plans under the Stability and Growth Pact requirements,
we set ! equal to zero.

















(ii) For values of E0 [c0(g0; b¤; a)] ¸ y¤: the deﬁcit constraint (22), and
E0 [c0(g0; b¤; aj b¤)] = y¤ (24)
while the global solution (b¤
G;a¤
G) to the deﬁcit-constrained optimum problem is given
by the solution to (17) and (22) evaluated at (b¤
G;a¤
G).
Proof. The conditions are immediate from the ﬁrst order conditions to the problem
in Deﬁnition 3.
Again, provided the optimisation occurs in a range along which the native house-
hold’s marginal utility is still positive – which occurs when expected consumption is
lower than the bliss point, i.e. E0 [c0(g0; b¤; a)] < y¤ – the operative necessary con-
dition for an optimum is the one that exploits the equality of the marginal rate of
substitution between the two forms of insurance – that “purchased” through a cut in
b¤ and that acquired by augmenting a – and the marginal rate of transformation of the
one into the other, given the deﬁcit condition. However, past the bliss level of expected
consumption, the optimum is nailed down by the condition that expected consumption
should be equal to its saturation point y¤.
Proposition 3– The local solution to the deﬁcit-constrained optimum problem,
(b¤,a¤), takes on the following form:
B1
b¤2
(1 ¡ a¤)2 + B2
a¤
(1 ¡ a¤)2 b¤ + B3
1
(1 ¡ a¤)2 b¤ + B4
1
1 ¡ a¤ b¤ +
B5
a¤
(1 ¡ a¤)2 + B6
1
(1 ¡ a¤)2 + B7
1
1 ¡ a
+ B8 = 0 (25)
1 ¡ a¤ = C1 + C2 b¤ (26)
where B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6,B7,B8,C1, and C2 are nonlinear functions of r, n, ½, ²,
dmax, and b0 .
Proof. The equations are immediate from the conditions in Proposition 2 by simple
algebra.
We can graphically grasp the intuition of the local solution to the problem set out in
Proposition 2 and shown in Proposition 3. For sensible calibrations of the parameters
r, n, ², and ½, – as we will see in detail in the next Section – the local solution is
such that b¤ < b0, and a¤ · 1. In order to numerically evaluate the sensitivity of the
obtained solution to the chosen parametric conﬁguration we present Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Given a, the solution for b¤ given in (25) and (26) can be obtained by solving a
quadratic function in b¤, say f(b¤ j a), where the coeﬃcients of this quadratic form
depends on a¤. Figure 3 plots the locus of points lying on the function f(b¤ j a) = 0.
The thick curve corresponds to the f(b¤ j a) associated with an economy with an initial
debt slightly above 60% of GDP, a real interest rate – equal to the rate of individual
20time preference – of 3.5%, an annual rate of real income growth of 1.5%, a maximum
output gap ² of almost 4% of potential and an autoregressive parameter for output
gaps of 0.6.19 The couple of points at which this curve intersects the horizontal axis
– only one of which is visible in the Figure – identify the two values of debt b¤ at
which the necessary conditions of the policy problem are satisﬁed. However, in order
to choose the debt ratio which, starting from around b0 = 60, the government should
set as the target for ﬁscal policy, one needs to evaluate the welfare of the taxpayer at
the two pairs of roots for b¤ and a. We checked that, within the subspace of parameter
values that is of interest to us, the welfare is maximised at the higher interior root for
b¤, i.e. b¤ < b0. Thus, referring to the archetypal case portrayed in Figure 3, the native
household in that economy would be ready to accept an excess burden around one
third of its normal income relative to future generations of taxpayers – the diﬀerence
between 60% and the 32% target indicated by the optimising b¤ – in exchange for
having: (i) the “core” non-contingent primary surplus s¤ curtailed from the current
1.2% of normal income, associated with a debt of 60%, to the 0.6% required to support
a debt of 25% in the long run; (ii) the budgetary elasticity of the primary surplus to
the gap boosted to 0.6.
These are local optima, however. An economy with the same structural parameters
but starting oﬀ from a debt burden of 100 per cent of normal income would obtain
a quite diﬀerent indication in terms of the appropriate target for ﬁscal policy – the
crossing point between the thin line and the horizontal axis indicates an optimal target
for debt between 65 and 70%. Now, if optimal debt can change according to the initial
conditions, and actually declines at progressively lower initial debt ratios, two issues
arise. The ﬁrst one, raised earlier in the paper, relates to the need for governments to
credibly commit to a policy at time zero. The second concerns the global optimum,
which once attained, constitutes a ﬁxed point of the optimisation problem solved by
the government.
As regards global optima, their characterisation in the deﬁcit constraint case is
relatively easy to get. The solution to the system formed by (17) and (22) yields a
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that provides the reduced form solution for b¤
G. For sensible values of the parameters





(1 ¡ ½)(1 + r)[dmax(y¤ ¡ ²) ¡ ²]
(r ¡ n)(1 + r ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ ½)(r2 + n)
(28)
Hence, provided that output gaps do not follow a random walk (with ½ = 1), the
sign of (28) depends on whether [dmax(y¤ ¡ ²) ¡ ²] is positive or negative. In turn, the





19This particular conﬁguration of parameter values broadly ﬁts the parameter conﬁguration of Germany.
See Section 5 below discussing our quantitative results.
21A superﬁcial comparison between (29) and (27) suﬃces to suggest the two key
results of our paper. Namely, that countries expecting output ﬂuctuations of moderate
amplitude would aﬀord targeting a less ambitious – i.e. non-negative – debt even in
the very long run. This notwithstanding, they would be able to target a very high
value for aG. This latter conclusion can be drawn by observing that (29) is equivalent
to aG ¸ 1 – see the term after the equality sign in (27).
Conversely, countries subject to more pronounced cycles ( ² >
dmax y¤
1+dmax) would have
to settle for both less automatic stabilisation (aG < 1) and a negative debt position in
the very long run. As is apparent from (29), the threshold between countries belonging
to the two diﬀerent groupings is traced by the numerical deﬁcit limit, dmax.
The next Section shall illustrate the general validity of this pattern of dependence
by means of a calibrated example.
5 A case study: Europe’s Stability and Growth
Pact
Issues in how to best reconcile welfare-enhancing ﬁscal planning with deﬁcit constraints
command strong interest in contemporary Europe. The move to an explicit rule-based
ﬁscal regime has accompanied European Monetary Union, in which ﬁscal positions
must respect the 3% maximum deﬁcit rule embedded in the Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, Europe’s awkward demographics and advanced
stage of development in terms of attainable productivity levels also make it an ideal
laboratory case for setting our optimal debt algorithm into work.
In an attempt to operationalise the Pact, several studies have examined which
country-speciﬁc ﬁscal positions can act as benchmarks guiding policy under the 3%
deﬁcit ceiling.20 The basic premise used to identify these benchmarks is simple. Since
budget deﬁcits are counter-cyclical and thus tend to worsen during downturns, and
since the maximum deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio that countries are allowed to run without
incurring penalties has to be obeyed in almost any state of the world – with the
exception of the most extreme – economies that are more prone to macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations and/or whose public budget is more sensitive to cyclical conditions should
aim for a lower deﬁcit on average. This practice suﬀers from a fundamental defect.
For it is true that, given a certain measure of the degree to which budgets respond to
cyclical variations, it is possible to pin down the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio that they should
target in the long run if they want to insure themselves against the risk of breaching the
limit once at a trough of a recession. It is also true that this deﬁcit benchmark bears
with itself, by implication, the extent to which current taxpayers should accelerate
debt repayment to bring their ﬁscal positions close to that target. Given the deﬁcit
benchmark dmax, it is very easy – just resorting to standard public ﬁnance arithmetic
– to calculate the debt level b¤ which would be consistent with sustaining a normal
deﬁcit of d¤ forever.
But, on the other hand, if at that juncture debt repayment and the target for debt
b¤ have to be treated as the outcome of a policy choice, a should also be thought of as
endogenously determined through the same policy process. If governments can decide
over both their target debt level b¤ and the degree to which they want their deﬁcits to
vary in response to cyclical ﬂuctuations, a, then simple stock-ﬂow ﬁscal arithmetics –
linking b¤ to a via the deﬁcit constraint – do not suﬃce anymore to nail down a new
ﬁscal regime in its entirety.
20See, for instance, European Commission (2000) and several recent studies of the National Institute of
Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
22As shown in the preceding Section, in the presence of constraints on government
borrowing, our model is capable to provide indications about both the optimal level of
debt and the optimal degree of response of deﬁcits to income ﬂuctuations. The rest of
the paper is devoted to apply the results stated at the end of the preceding Section to
the case of the European Union (EU) under the Stability and Growth Pact. Subsection
5.1 explains how we calibrate our model to obtain illustrative estimates for a number
of Member States of the EU. Subsection 5.2 then proceeds to the discussion of our
numerical results.
5.1 Calibration
In obtaining illustrative quantitative estimates on the basis of a stylised representation
of selected EU countries21, some parameters (such as y¤, r, n, b0, !, ²) are calibrated,
while the degree of persistence of the output gap (½) is estimated.
Values for the initial debt ratios, b0, are calibrated to the estimates for general
government consolidated gross debt (Maastricht deﬁnition) as a percentage of gross
domestic product at market prices, as contained in European Commission (2000). In-
terest rates, r, are set at 3.5% for all countries, in the vicinity of long-run observations
for long-term real interest rates. The parameter calibration for population growth, n,
is taken as ﬁxed at 1.5%, while the real rate of time preference, ¯, is set to one for the
baseline scenario. As pointed out earlier, the degree of tolerance with respect to the
institutional deﬁcit constraint, !, is set to zero in the baseline scenario for all countries.
The parameter y¤ is normalised to 100 in order to interpret output gap realisations as
deviations in percentage points.
Country-speciﬁc estimates of the persistence (½) and magnitude (²) are extracted
from output gaps as measured by the European Commission. This output gap mea-
sure is based on the percentage deviation of actual output from trend output, with the
Commission measure of gt based on an estimation of trend output using the Hodrick-
Prescott Filter, which by design induces stationarity-inducing transformation to the
data.22 The calibrated degree of persistence of period-t output gap shocks for each
country is obtained from a ﬁrst-order autoregressive model of the form proposed in
(2), estimated over the period 1960-1999. When assessed against higher-order autore-
gressive models, this speciﬁcation best characterises the data, as would be expected
given the use of HP-ﬁltered series.
Estimates of ², representing the ex-post variability of output gaps, are obtained
by taking the average of the maximum and minimum values of the observed output
gap over the sample period used to obtain estimates of ½. This methodology used to
calibrate this parameter is similar to that used by the European Commission (2000) in
deﬁning a set of budgetary benchmarks, whereby the largest weighted average of the
two largest negative output gaps recorded in each EU Member State between 1960 and
1997 is used in generating these benchmarks. In order to compensate for the absence
of an adequate treatment of structural breaks in the Commission estimates of g0, the
maximum amplitude of maximum output gaps was censored for observed output gaps
in excess of 7.5% of trend output. This results in a censoring of ² of output gap
observations only for Finland (in 1989 and 1993).
For the sake of simplicity, the estimates of ² are reproduced on the basis of iid draws
from a uniform distribution deﬁned over the compact symmetric support [¡e;+e]. This
21Greece and Portugal are excluded to avoid any bias that could be associated with a “catching up”
process, in which special factors could distort a comparison with other EU countries.
22Note that the adopted measure of output gaps is equivalent to the per capita output gap, given that
oﬀsetting adjustment for population must be made to both actual and trend GDP in the calculation.
23yields a uniform distribution distributed over the interval [¡²;²], where the variance
of et is such that ¾2
e = e2
3 . When t = 0, and given g¡1 = 0, the implied gap g0 is
uniform over the same closed support as the shock e0. In general, however, the presence
of persistence in the output gap generates an ex-post distribution for gt uniformly
distributed over a diﬀerent support, [¡²;²], where ² is calculated as follows. On the







given that gt is uniform, it has to be that, ¾2
g = ²2
3 . Then, equating both expressions
for the variance of the gap, it is easy to see that, ² = e=
p
1 ¡ ½2.
The calibration of e is made in order to replicate ² according to the above formula.
The distribution function associated to each occurrence of the gap, gt, is such that
dGj = 1
2²dgj. It is worth noticing that, as the time horizon increases, t ! 1, the
uniform distribution, by virtue of the Central Limit Theorem, would converge to a
normal distribution. Even when our maximisation problem has an inﬁnite horizon, this
convergence fact is not relevant for our theoretical results, although when simulating
might imply that, ex-post, a small percentage of the realisations of the gap would lie
outside the theoretical limits [¡²;²]. Nevertheless, as the sample size increases, the gap
becomes the sum of an increasing number of uniformly distributed random variables,
with a decreasing weight as time goes by, gt =
Pt
j=0 ½jet¡j. This way, the gap shows
a zero expected value, and a variance such that, ¾2
g = e2
3 (1 + ½2 + ½4 + :::) = e2
3(1¡½2).
So, as the sample size increases, T ! 1, the distribution of the output gap converges





In order to quantify local and global optima for the set of our ﬁscal choice variables,
b¤ and a, we proceed as follows. We ﬁrst search for the locally optimal pair of policy
variables b¤ and a from the ﬁrst-order condition of the government, given the country-
speciﬁc value of b0, and on the basis of a schedule for the non-negative excess tax
kt(k;gt) which would imply no excess duty levied on the current generations in a
situation in which these should ﬁnd themselves operating under binding borrowing
restrictions (i.e. whenever g0 < Γ0). Then we identify the globally optimal pair of
policy variables, b¤
G and a¤
G. In obtaining results, a sequence of uniformly-distributed
independent random shocks to the period-t output gap are applied to the model in
order to assess simulated convergence properties. It is found that the model converges
to its steady state under all sensible parameter conﬁgurations, while breaches of the
deﬁcit limit over the transition path to the steady state remains below ﬁve per cent of
total observations under the baseline conﬁguration. The existence of a small number of
breaches during the transition can be understood in that the deﬁcit limit is formulated
to be valid over the steady state, (22). Clearly, this only an approximation to the
“true” limit that should be observed when total debt ﬂuctuates around b¤ in a random
fashion, and in this sense it need not necessarily be always equal to b¤ in all states of
nature. The actual interest spending that the government would have to sustain at
the trough of a recession along the stochastic steady state, rb¤
t(¡²), would be higher
than the interest rb¤ payable when the debt level is exactly equal to its zero-output-gap
steady state target b¤– because rb¤
t(¡²) ¸ rb¤(0) = rb¤. The introduction of the latter
concept of interest into our steady state condition relating s¤ to b¤, which we then used
for calculating our optimal pair fb¤, ag, is compensated for by being more cautious in
some other respects, such as setting tolerance of breaches of the 3% limit of the Pact




As expected, countries experiencing large output ﬂuctuations on average, as measured
by ², have a lower local target for debt. For instance, according to our exercise, the
parameterisation corresponding to the living electorate in Finland indicates a readiness
to pay a substantial sum in order to have the non-contingent primary surplus reduced
in the steady state from the level needed to permanently sustain a debt ratio at the
current level of around 40% of GDP – to a target of a balanced primary budget con-
sistent with a near-zero target debt ratio prescribed by the policy exercise. Similarly,
hypothetical voters in Denmark and Spain would be almost as ambitious as those in
Finland, although their ﬁnal target debt would be higher. By contrast, other countries
with less volatile GDP and/or with larger initial debt burdens would content them-
selves with a more measured approach to ﬁscal stabilisation. Indeed, countries such as
that of Finland and Denmark, with strong self-insurance motives, have embarked on
a precipitous reduction of their debt levels in the recent past. By contrast, other EU
member states, such as France and Austria, with less risky aggregate income proﬁles –
and thus lesser incentives toward ﬁscal retrenchment according to our line of reasoning
– could indeed aﬀord a more relaxed time schedule for debt redemption.
The local targets for the sensitivity of primary surpluses to output gaps are consid-
erably larger than the current values as estimated in the literature. Indeed, while recent
studies estimate actual a to be in the vicinity of 0.2 for the euro area as a whole – see
Wyplosz (1999) and M´ elitz (2000) – according to our model these electorates would be
happy to pay a tax for having the automatic subsidy accruing from the budget in bad
times increased to between one half and 80% of realised income shortfalls. Countries
with output ﬂuctuations of a lesser amplitude – France, Austria and the Netherlands
– would target a budgetary sensitivity higher than countries at the opposite extreme.
This can be understood in that for them the cost of this form of insurance, based on
an ex-post rather than ex-ante arrangement, would be lower given initial debt in terms
of the ﬁscal adjustment if the deﬁcit constraint is to be observed in all circumstances.
5.2.2 Global optima
The diversity in initial ﬁscal positions is the primary factor behind the wide range of
optimal local debt targets that the same optimisation problem would indicate for dif-
ferent governments. A less dispersed set of ﬁxed points for b¤
G and aG in the very long
run characterises the convergence trajectories of the various countries under analysis.
The numerical targets for a, given in the last column of Table 1, point to the existence
of a quite substantial pent-up demand for automatic stabilisation for the parameter
conﬁguration corresponding to these countries. If freed from the burden of their in-
herited debts, electorates would be happy to forego a great deal of consumption in
good times in exchange for robust income subsidisation in bad times. When brought
to roughly the same initial conditions, results indicate that electorates would choose
that no less than two thirds of their envisaged income shortfalls be compensated by an
endogenous correction of taxes and transfers. Accompanying this result is the readiness
of electorates for footing the cost of turning a debt into an asset position, if that is
what the frequency and severity of recessions require them to do in order to respect
the deﬁcit ceiling of the Stability and Growth Pact.
25The targets for b¤
G are also more tightly dispersed than their local counterparts. In
the baseline scenario, these net asset positions would numerically be comprised between
a quarter of GDP – under Finland’s very high estimated output volatility – and near-
zero, with ﬁve out of eleven countries clustering around a balanced net asset position
and two other countries – Germany and Sweden – not far from there.
On the whole, countries expecting output ﬂuctuations of moderate amplitude would
aﬀord targeting a less ambitious – i.e. non-negative – debt even in the very long run.
Notwithstanding this, they would be able to target a very high value for aG. Conversely,
countries subject to more pronounced cycles would have to settle for both less automatic
stabilisation (aG < 1) and a negative debt position in the very long run. The threshold
between countries belonging to the two diﬀerent groupings is traced by the numerical
deﬁcit limit.
5.2.3 Robustness
In order to gauge the extent to which the results are dependent on the chosen base-
line parameterisation, the sensitivity of results to perturbations to the key calibrated
parameters is considered. The results of this exercise, contained in Table 2, indicate a
good degree of robustness to changes in r and n, with results not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the baseline for movements in these calibrated parameters. Changes to the rate
of time preference, on the other hand, tend to have a more pronounced eﬀect. Holding
all else equal, an increase in ± results in a reduction in the steady-state debt ratio with
respect to the baseline accompanied by an increase in the optimal degree of budgetary
stabilisation. This can be interpreted simply as a translation of the increased degree
of impatience into a desire for a lower degree of core taxation, s¤, combined with a
heightened degree of automatic stabilisation.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
6 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper formalises the basic trade-oﬀ faced by policymakers
when households are not free to borrow against their future income and an excess tax
designed to bring down the level of debt can be designed in a way not to excessively
penalise the household’s disposable resources in low-endowment conditions.
Adopting a quadratic utility function, we are able to derive a closed-form local and
global analytical solution of optimal debt for a given degree of budgetary responsiveness
to the economic cycle and optimal budgetary stabilisation. The derived expressions
show how the two insurance schemes can cushion consumption against unfavourable
income shocks, and how the desirability of insurance coverage in the form of increased
budgetary responsiveness to cyclical ﬂuctuations or debt reduction increases with un-
certainty.
We take this analysis one step further by including a deﬁcit constraint, which allows
us to solve jointly for the desired level of public debt and degree of automatic stabil-
isation. Illustrative numerical simulation results are derived from a calibration of the
model to a subset of EU Member States, and yield the unambiguous policy indication
from a normative standpoint that these electorates, with no exception, regard their
current ﬁscal situation as unsatisfactory. In addition to the ﬁnding that current public
liabilities are too burdensome to be considered sustainable in periods of economic dis-
tress, when the payment of taxes detracts directly from consumption one-by-one, it is
found that budgets are too rigid and the operation of automatic stabilisers too feeble to
26be of help in smoothing consumption across states of nature. The amount of resources
that our mildly risk-averse, selﬁsh individuals would surrender to bring about more
balanced, ﬂexible and responsive public ﬁnances is potentially quite sizeable. From a
positive standpoint, the results suggest reasons why diﬀerent countries in Europe have
recently embarked on policies of debt re-absorption of such diﬀerent intensities. Euro-
pean countries which historically experienced ampler than normal output ﬂuctuations
(say, Finland and Denmark) have recently embarked on very courageous policies of
debt reduction, while countries on the other end of the spectrum in terms of output
volatility (say, France and Austria) could aﬀord a more measured approach to ﬁscal
stabilisation. Our results suggest, again, a self-insurance perspective for looking at the
speed at which distinct countries decide to redeem public debt. In this logic, electorates
who face particularly erratic income proﬁles can develop an appetite for dramatic debt
cutbacks, whereas voters who feel less pressing motives to be concerned about income
riskiness might be more relaxed about ﬁscal adjustment.
Notice that this ﬁnding – strong and unambiguous as it is – has been derived
on the basis of a model which, if anything, was constructed to bias the ﬁnal results
against the voluntary purchase of insurance through debt repayment. Indeed, our
households are risk averse – which is why they choose to self-insure anyway – but
act in a totally imprudent manner in the face of the uncertainty that looms ahead.
Although they dislike uncertainty, they basically behave as if there were none. More
prudent households – saving also against the possibility of being liquidity constrained
in the future – would demand larger amounts of automatic stabilisation a and would
be willing to pay more in exchange for it.
While we would not regard these policy prescriptions as deﬁnitive before conducting
further analysis on the basis of a richer model – notably including physical capital –
they are nevertheless very suggestive in pointing to a univocal direction. Namely, that
countries expecting output ﬂuctuations of moderate amplitude will target a less ambi-
tious debt reduction both in the short run – that is, looking forward from their current
initial conditions – and in the very long run and will always aﬀord a more responsive
system of ﬁscal stabilisers. Conversely, countries subject to more pronounced cycles
will always be willing to accept both less automatic stabilisation and a more aggressive
policy of debt repayment, in the short run as well as in the very long haul.
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29Appendix
A. Solution to the consumption problem
This sub-section illustrates how the rule of thumb for consumption given in (8) can be
derived under our assumption that households set a target for consumption equal to the
level at which they would consume if they were not borrowing constrained, i.e. under
the permanent-income hypothesis. As explained in the text, the adoption of such a rule
implies that households: ﬁrst, ﬁnd the level of consumption that would be dictated –
given the prevailing income conditions – by the permanent-income hypothesis, i.e. cPI
t ;
and then try to set actual consumption equal to cPI
t unless current spendable resources
y¤ + gt + (1 + r)wt¡1 ¡ (st + kt) fall short of cPI
t , in which case they exhaust current
resources and put ct = y¤ +gt +(1+r)wt¡1 ¡(st +kt): The second subsection of this
Appendix shows that this simple rule of thumb performs extremely well in tracking the
truly optimal consumption decision implied by the exact solution to the optimisation
problem under borrowing limits.
Under the rule of thumb, at a generic time t, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the maximisation of (1) subject to (3) and wt+1 ¸ 0; are provided by the following
set of Kuhn-Tucker relations:
@U(ct)
@ct
¡ ¸1;t = 0 (30)





Et¸1;t+1 = 0 (31)
¸2;twt+1 = 0;¸2;t ¸ 0 (32)
where ¸1;t and ¸2;t are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the time-t constraint
(3) and with wt+1 ¸ 0; respectively. Notice that under this rule of thumb the house-
hold does not internalise the future borrowing constraints wt+j, for j > 1. We can
diﬀerentiate two cases depending on whether the borrowing restriction binds or not at
the time t of decision.
Case i. Assuming wt+1 ¸ 0, then ¸2;t = 0, and from (30) and (31), the optimum













Using (33), wt can be solved forward by means of (3). This gives us the expression
for consumption, called cPI
t , in the upper part of (8). The optimal solution for
wealth is then given by the resource constraint (3).
Case ii. If given a solution for time-t consumption from Case i.the implied solution
for wealth from the resource constraint (3) is such that wt+1 < 0: Then, taking
account of the non-negativity constraint on contemporary net worth, wt+1 ¸ 0,
the set of optimality conditions given by (30), (31) and (32) imply ¸2;t ¸ 0 ,
wt+1 = 0 and then we get that the implied solution for consumption is given by
the lower part of (8).
B. Proof of Proposition 1
In this subsection of the Appendix we prove the result stated in Proposition 1. To
start with, we use Lemma 2 to contract the highly dimensional dynamic problem faced
by the government at time zero in its static counterpart.
30Lemma 2 – Under Assumption 2, and ruling out the possibility of reschedulings at
a later stage, for any given self-liquidating repayment scheme, kt(gt) ¸ 0,
Arg max









t(b¤; a; gt )]dGt
= Arg max





0(b¤; a; gt )dG0
¶
= Arg max









0(b¤; a; gt )dG0 is the expected individual consumption function at date zero,
conditional on the kt(g0), and c¤




0(b¤; a; gt )dG0 · C = y¤.
Proof. The former equality sign follows from the linear-quadratic and Markov
properties of our system (see Svensson, 1999, and Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000, Chap-
ter 1). That the state of the system obeys a Markov process is proved by Clarida (1987),
in his Corollary 2.2. The latter equality sign follows from a ﬁrst-order Taylor approxi-
mation of the quadratic expected utility at time zero around expected consumption at
the same time. [c. q. d.]
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i). Under the conditions in Lemma 2, given a,
the optimal solution for b¤ comes from equation (19). For this optimality condition to
hold, it has to be that,
@E0(ˆ c(b¤;a=b0))
@b¤ = 0





0(b¤; a; gt )dG0
and taking its partial derivative with respect to b¤it is possible to obtain (16) with a
bit of laborious algebra, where
Φ(a;²;½jr ¡ n) =
(r ¡ 2n)(1 ¡ ½)2(1 + r)(n + r)(1 ¡ a)2²
r4(1 + r ¡ ½)[(n + r)(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ a) + (1 + r)a]
For the solution in (16) to yield a stable reduction of debt from any arbitrary b0, it
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition that the coeﬃcient Φ(a;²;½jr ¡ n) be positive.
For a < 1 and ½ < 1, it is clear that it is necessary and suﬃcient that r > 2n. As
regards the global optimum, for a stationary solution to the government problem to be
such that b0 = b¤ = b¤
G, it is necessary and suﬃcient that




(y¤ ¡ E0 [ˆ c(b¤;a=b0 = b¤ = b¤
G)]) = 0
Plugging into this expression the expected individual consumption function at time
zero, E0(ˆ c(b¤;a)) =
R ²
¡² c¤
0(b¤; a; gt )dG0;particularised at b0 = b¤ = b¤
G one can get the
global optimum in the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1.
As regards the proof of Part (ii) : to solve simultaneously for b¤ and a it is necessary





b¤ = b0 ¡ Φ2 (a;²;½jr ¡ n); Φ2 (a;²;½jr ¡ n) =
(1 ¡ ½)(1 + r)²(1 ¡ a)
r(1 + r ¡ ½)
(35)
To solve for b¤ and a we have, then, two conditions given by (16) and (35). By
simple substitution it is clear that the pair a = 1 and b¤ = b0 solves both equations.
Also, this solution is unique, in the sense that there is no other combination of (b¤;a)
that it is a solution to the government problem. If, for any a, we subtract (16) from
the alternative solution for b¤, (35), and given that r3 ! 0, the result is,
(r ¡ 2n)
¡
(1 ¡ ½) (n + r) (1 ¡ a)2¢
= 0
that, given that by hypothesis r ¡ 2n > 0, it is only solved by a ! 1. [c. q. d.]
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